Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms for Public Decision with Money

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Hashimoto, Kazuhikoほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2016-03-22

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We study strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in a binary public decision model when monetary transfers are allowed. We consider not only the pivot...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms for Public Decision with Money
Author/Editor: Hashimoto, Kazuhiko
Shiozawa, Kohei
Author Heading: Hashimoto, Kazuhiko
Shiozawa, Kohei
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2016-03-22
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2016-03-22
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 964
Volume: 964
Pages: 1-32
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Strategy-proofness
Budget-balance
Second-best efficiency
Public decision
Pivotal mechanism
Random chair pivotal mecha nism
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We study strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in a binary public decision model when monetary transfers are allowed. We consider not only the pivotal mechanism, the majority voting mechanism, the random serial dictatorship mechanism, and the unanimity mechanism, but also the random chair pivotal mechanism (Faltings 2005), which is a probabilistic variant of the pivotal mechanism. We first show that the random chair pivotal mechanism, the majority voting mechanism, the random serial dictatorship mechanism, and the unanimity mechanism are second-best efficient. Next, we calculate the expected welfare of the mechanisms by the Monte Carlo method, where each agent's valuation is independently, identically, and uniformly (or normally) distributed. These calculations exhibit that the random chair pivotal mechanism is more efficient than the other mechanisms. We also show that in large economies, the random chair pivotal mechanism is efficient, while the other mechanisms might be highly inefficient. Finally, we characterize the random chair pivotal mechanism with strategy-proofness, budget-balance, equal treatment of equals, and decision-robustness.
References (URI): URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2016/DP0964.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華