Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences : Characterization of Minimum Price Rule

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Zhou, Yuほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2016-05

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We consider the allocation problem of assigning heterogenous objects to a group of agents and determining how much they should pay. Each agent receive...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences : Characterization of Minimum Price Rule
Author/Editor: Zhou, Yu
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Author Heading: Zhou, Yu
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040807450
Serizawa, Shigehiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090252717
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2016-05
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2016-05
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 971
Volume: 971
Pages: 1-27
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: strategy-proofness
efficiency
non-quasi-linearity
minimum price rule
common-object-ranking domain
common-tiered-object domain
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We consider the allocation problem of assigning heterogenous objects to a group of agents and determining how much they should pay. Each agent receives at most one object. Agents have non-quasi-linear preferences over bundles, each consisting of an object and a payment. Especially, we focus on the cases: (i) objects are linearly ranked, and as long as objects are equally priced, agents commonly prefer a higher ranked object to a lower ranked one, and (ii) objects are partitioned into several tiers, and as long as objects are equally priced, agents commonly prefer an object in the higher tier to an object in the lower tier. The minimum price rule assigns a minimum price (Walrasian) equilibrium to each preference pro.le. We establish: (i) on a common-object-ranking domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy, and (ii) on a common-tiered-object domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying these four axioms.
References (URI): URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2016/DP0971.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華