Non-manipulability of Walrasian mechanisms in economies with a large number of objects

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Tajika, Tomoyaほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2016-05

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We consider a problem of allocating multiple identical objects to a group of agents and collecting payments. Each agent may receive several objects an...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Non-manipulability of Walrasian mechanisms in economies with a large number of objects
Author/Editor: Tajika, Tomoya
Kazumura, Tomoya
Author Heading: Tajika, Tomoya
Kazumura, Tomoya
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050804960
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2016-05
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2016-05
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 972
Volume: 972
Pages: 1-31
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Non-manipulability
Walrasianmechanism
Vickreymechanism
asymptotic domination
replica economy
submodular preferences
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We consider a problem of allocating multiple identical objects to a group of agents and collecting payments. Each agent may receive several objects and has quasi-linearpreferenceswithasubmodularvaluationfunction. ItisknownthatWalrasian mechanisms are manipulable. We investigate the incentive property of Walrasian mechanisms in economies with a large number of objects. Given a set of agents and a preference proﬁle, an agent i asymptotically dominates an agent j if at suﬃciently many objects, i’s incremental valuation is higher than j’s incremental valuation. We show that for each economy, if there is no agent asymptotically dominating the other agents, and if there are suﬃciently many objects, any Walrasian mechanism is non-manipulable at the economy. We also consider replica economies, and show that for each economy, if it is replicated suﬃciently many times, the minimum price Walrasian mechanisms are non-manipulable at the replica economy. Keywords. Non-manipulability,Walrasianmechanism,Vickreymechanism,asymptotic domination, replica economy, submodular preferences.
References (URI): URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2016/DP0972.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華