Optimal Capital Income Taxation in the Case of Private Donations to Public Goods

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Morita, Shigeoほか

Publisher: Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University

Publication date: 2016-08

Material Format: Paper

Capacity, size, etc.: -

NDC: -

View All

Notes on use

Note (General)：: In this study, we investigate optimal nonlinear labor and capital income taxation and subsidies for contribution goods in a dynamic setting. We show t...

Search by Bookstore

Holdings of Libraries in Japan

This page shows libraries in Japan other than the National Diet Library that hold the material.

List of Cooperating Institutions and Databases

Please contact your local library for information on how to use materials or whether it is possible to request materials from the holding libraries.

other

OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive)
Paper
You can check the holdings of institutions and databases with which 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ） is linked at the site of 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）.
OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive)

Search by Bookstore

Bibliographic Record

You can check the details of this material, its authority (keywords that refer to materials on the same subject, author's name, etc.), etc.

Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Optimal Capital Income Taxation in the Case of Private Donations to Public Goods
Author/Editor: Morita, Shigeo
Obara, Takuya
Author Heading: Morita, Shigeo
Obara, Takuya
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
Publication Date: 2016-08
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2016-08
Periodical title: Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
No. or year of volume/issue: 16-21
Volume: 16-21
Pages: 1-13
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Capital income
Private donations
Tax treatment
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): In this study, we investigate optimal nonlinear labor and capital income taxation and subsidies for contribution goods in a dynamic setting. We show that when individuals can contribute to a public good—even if additive and separable preference between consumption and labor supply is assumed and individuals diﬀer only in earning ability—marginal capital income tax rate for low-income earners is not zero, indicating that the Atkinson–Stiglitz theorem does not hold. In particular, heterogeneous tastes for private consumptions endogenously occur. In addition, we derive a formula for optimal tax treatment of a public good, which is expressed in terms of the Pigouvian eﬀect and the eﬀect on an incentive compatibility constraint.
References (URI): http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1621.pdf
URI
http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1621.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華