The Direction of Strategic Delegation and Voter Welfare in Asymmetric Tax Competition Models

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Terai, Kimikoほか

Publisher: Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University

Publication date: 2016-11

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: This paper examined a political process and economic consequences of tax competition among asymmetric countries. Citizens are endowed with heterogeneo...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: The Direction of Strategic Delegation and Voter Welfare in Asymmetric Tax Competition Models
Author/Editor: Terai, Kimiko
Nishimura, Yukihiro
Author Heading: Terai, Kimiko
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080350213
Nishimura, Yukihiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090345471
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
Publication Date: 2016-11
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2016-11
Periodical title: Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
No. or year of volume/issue: 16-27
Volume: 16-27
Pages: 1-22
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Capital tax competition
Strategic delegation
Asymmetric countries
Voter welfare
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): This paper examined a political process and economic consequences of tax competition among asymmetric countries. Citizens are endowed with heterogeneous capital incomes. The median-voters deliberately elect a delegate whose preferences differ from their own, to pursue advantages in the international tax competition. When the countries have different productivity of the capital, the country with a low capital productivity may delegate the tax authority to a citizen who is richer than the median-voter. As a result, the outcome through strategic delegation may make the median-voters and the majority of citizens worse-off than the selfrepresentation outcome, contrary to the previous studies with symmetric countries.Similar results are obtained when the countries differ in capital endowments. In contrast, when the countries differ in population size, productive inefficiency is reduced, and the median-voters are better-off through strategic delegation. We also point out that the role of campaign promises is important for the equilibrium tax rates and citizens’welfare.
References (URI): http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1627.pdf
URI
http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1627.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華