Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Aoyagi, Masakiほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2017-03-13

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: This paper presents an experimental analysis of 2×2 coordination games in which player 1 earns a substantially higher payoff than player 2 except in t...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality
Author/Editor: Aoyagi, Masaki
Nishimura, Naoko
Okano, Yoshitaka
Author Heading: Aoyagi, Masaki
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050314430
Nishimura, Naoko
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000030218200
Okano, Yoshitaka
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000020513120
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2017-03-13
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2017-03-13
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 992
Volume: 992
Pages: 1-49
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: heterogeneity
equity
efficiency
transfer
reciprocity
laboratory experiments
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): This paper presents an experimental analysis of 2×2 coordination games in which player 1 earns a substantially higher payoff than player 2 except in the inefficient equilibrium where they earn the same payoffs. The main focus is on the comparison of two treatments with and without the ex post redistribution stage in which both players may voluntarily transfer their payoffs earned in the game to the other player. We find that (1) the transfer opportunity raises the probability of coordination on an efficient equilibrium, (2) a transfer from player 1 to player 2 is positive, and is higher when player 2 chooses the action corresponding to the efficient equilibrium, and hence (3) the transfer opportunity tends to improve the efficiency and equity of the final outcome. Furthermore, these tendencies are stronger when the two players have conflicting interests over the two equilibria than when they have common interests.
References (URI): URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2017/DP0992.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華