Local Independence, Monotonicity, Incentive Compatibility and Axiomatic Characterization of Price-Money Message Mechanism

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Urai, Kenほか

Publisher: Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University

Publication date: 2017-04

Material Format: Paper

Capacity, size, etc.: -

NDC: -

View All

Notes on use

Note (General)：: To characterize money in a static economic model, it is known to be important to consider the agent-commodity double-infinity settings, i.e., the over...

Search by Bookstore

Holdings of Libraries in Japan

This page shows libraries in Japan other than the National Diet Library that hold the material.

List of Cooperating Institutions and Databases

Please contact your local library for information on how to use materials or whether it is possible to request materials from the holding libraries.

other

OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive)
Paper
You can check the holdings of institutions and databases with which Institutional Repositories DataBase(IRDB)(Institutional Repository) is linked at the site of Institutional Repositories DataBase(IRDB)(Institutional Repository).
OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive)

Search by Bookstore

Bibliographic Record

You can check the details of this material, its authority (keywords that refer to materials on the same subject, author's name, etc.), etc.

Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Local Independence, Monotonicity, Incentive Compatibility and Axiomatic Characterization of Price-Money Message Mechanism
Author/Editor: Urai, Ken
Murakami, Hiromi
Author Heading: Urai, Ken
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000000203597
Murakami, Hiromi
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080803072
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
Publication Date: 2017-04
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2017-04
Periodical title: Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
No. or year of volume/issue: 17-08
Volume: 17-08
Pages: 1-15
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Resource Allocation Mechanism
Social Choice Correspondence
Overlapping-Generations Economy
Monotonicity
Incentive Compatibility
Universal Mapping Property
Monetary Walras Allocation
Local Independence
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): To characterize money in a static economic model, it is known to be important to consider the agent-commodity double-infinity settings, i.e., the overlapping-generations framework. There does not seem to exist abundant literature, however, treating the axiomatic characterization problems for such monetary Walras allocations under the social choice and/or mechanism design settings. We show that the monetary Walras allocation for the economy with double infinities is characterized by weak Pareto-optimality, individual rationality and local independence or the monotonicity, or the incentive compatibility conditions of social choice correspondence among the allocation mechanisms with messages under the category theoretic approach in Sonnenschein (1974). We utilize Sonnenschein's market extension axiom for swamped economies that is closely related to the replica stability axiom of Thomson (1988). We can see how these conditions characterize the price-money message mechanism universally among a wide class of mechanisms, and efficiently in the sense that it has the minimal message spaces (price-money dictionary theorems). Moreover, by using the category theoretic framework, we can obtain the up-to-isomorphism uniqueness for such a dictionary object (isomorphism theorems).
Periodical Title (NCID): AA1160366X
https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/AA1160366X
References (URI): URI
http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1708.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華