Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Kazumura, Tomoyaほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2020-01

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: May 2017. Revised January 2020A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over cons...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
Author/Editor: Kazumura, Tomoya
Mishra, Debasis
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Author Heading: Kazumura, Tomoya
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050804960
Mishra, Debasis
Serizawa, Shigehiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090252717
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2020-01
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2020-01
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1001
Volume: 1001
Pages: 1-55
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: multi-object allocation
strategy-proofness
ex-post revenue maximization
minimum Walrasian equilibrium price mechanism
non-quasilinear preferences
no wastage
equal treatment of equals
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): May 2017. Revised January 2020
A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object,transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1) strategy-proofness, (2) ex-post individual rationality, (3) equal treatment of equals, (4) no wastage (every object is allocated to some agent). The minimum Walrasian equilibrium price (MWEP) mechanism is desirable. We show that at each preference profile, the MWEP mechanism generates more revenue for the seller than any desirable mechanism satisfying no subsidy. Our result works for quasilinear type space, where the MWEP mechanism is the VCG mechanism, and for various non-quasilinear type spaces, some of which incorporate positive income effect of agents. We can relax no subsidy to no bankruptcy in our result for certain type spaces with positive income effect.
References (URI): URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2017/DP1001R.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華