Mechanism design without quasilinearity

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Kazumura, Tomoyaほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2017-06-08

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (1) we characterize ...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Author/Editor: Kazumura, Tomoya
Mishra, Debasis
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Author Heading: Kazumura, Tomoya
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050804960
Mishra, Debasis
Serizawa, Shigehiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090252717
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2017-06-08
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2017-06-08
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1005
Volume: 1005
Pages: 1-61
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: incentive compatibility
individual rationality
monotonicity
non-quasilinear preferences
revenue equivalence
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant strategy implementable allocation rule, there is a unique payment rule that can implement it; and (3) we show that every dominant strategy incentive compatible, individually rational, and revenue-maximizing mechanism must charge zero transfer for the worst alternative (outside option). These results are applicable in a wide variety of problems (single object auction, multiple object auction, public good provision etc.) under suitable richness of type space. In particular, our results can be applied to models where preferences of agents are arbitrarily small perturbations of quasilinear preferences and illustrate the (non)-robustness of some of the classic results in mechanism design with quasilinearity. We show various applications of our results.
References (URI): http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2017/DP1005.pdf
URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2017/DP1005.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華