Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Zhou, Yuほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2019-01

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We investigate an assignment market in which multiple objects are assigned, together with associated payments, to a group of agents with unit demand p...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market
Author/Editor: Zhou, Yu
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Author Heading: Zhou, Yu
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040807450
Serizawa, Shigehiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090252717
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2019-01
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2019-01
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1047
Volume: 1047
Pages: 1-53
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Assignment market
minimum price equilibrium
income effects
Serial Vickrey process
housing market
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We investigate an assignment market in which multiple objects are assigned, together with associated payments, to a group of agents with unit demand preferences. Preferences over bundles, the pairs of (object, payment), accommodate income effects. Among all (Walrasian) equilibria in such a market, there is one supported by the coordinate-wise minimum prices, the minimum price equilibrium (MPE). We propose a price adjustment process, “the Serial Vickrey process,” that finds an MPE in a finite number of steps. The Serial Vickrey process introduces objects one by one, and on the basis of the structural properties of MPE, the “Serial Vickrey sub-process” sequentially finds an MPE for k + 1 objects by using an MPE for k objects. In the Serial Vickrey process, instead of revealing the whole preference, each agent only reports finitely many “indifference prices.” We also discuss the application of the Serial Vickrey process to calibrate agents' utility functions in the quantitative analysis of housing market research in the assignment model.
References (URI): https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2019/DP1047.pdf
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2019/DP1047.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華