Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Chen, Chia-Huiほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2020-08

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: 2019-07. Revised Aug 2020.High-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success in risky experimentation, but learn faster that their project i...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation
Author/Editor: Chen, Chia-Hui
Ishida, Junichiro
Suen, Wing
Author Heading: Chen, Chia-Hui
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000020768238
Ishida, Junichiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040324222
Suen, Wing
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2020-08
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2020-08
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1060
Volume: 1060
Pages: 1-ⅱ
ISSN (Periodical Title): PISSN : 0473453X
EISSN : 24350982
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: double-crossing property
dynamic signaling
venture startups
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): 2019-07. Revised Aug 2020.
High-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success in risky experimentation, but learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model with double-crossing property. This property tends to induce homogenization of quitting times between types, which in turn leads to some pooling in equilibrium. Low-ability agents may hold out to continue their project for the prospect of pooling with the high type, despite having a negative instantaneous net payoff. A war-of-attrition mechanism causes low-ability agents to quit only gradually over time, and to stop quitting for a period immediately before all agents exit.
References (URI): https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2019/DP1060R.pdf
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2019/DP1060R.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華