Public debt rule breaking by time-inconsistent voters

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Arawatari, Ryoほか

Publisher: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

Publication date: 2019-10

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: This study considers how present-biased preferences influence public debt policy when a violation of debt rules is possible. To address this issue, th...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Public debt rule breaking by time-inconsistent voters
Author/Editor: Arawatari, Ryo
Ono, Tetsuo
Author Heading: Arawatari, Ryo
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000020547335
Ono, Tetsuo
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050305661
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2019-10
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2019-10
Periodical title: Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
No. or year of volume/issue: 19-14
Volume: 19-14
Pages: 1-40
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Debt ceilings
Present bias
Public debt
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): This study considers how present-biased preferences influence public debt policy when a violation of debt rules is possible. To address this issue, the study extends the framework of Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (American Economic Review 105, (2015), 1711–1737) by allowing for rule breaking with extra costs, and we show that rule breaking occurs when a country exhibits a strong present bias. We further extend the model by introducing a political process for determining the debt rule, and we show that a polarization of debt rules emerges between countries with high and low degrees of present bias.
Periodical Title (NCID): AA1160366X
https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/AA1160366X
References (URI): URI
http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/1914.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華