Who is audited? Experimental study of rule-based tax auditing

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Kamijo, Yoshioほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2019-10

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We employed a game-theoretic framework to formulate and analyze a number of tax audit rules, especially the lowest income reporter audited rule. We ex...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Who is audited? Experimental study of rule-based tax auditing
Author/Editor: Kamijo, Yoshio
Masuda, Takehito
Uemura, Hiroshi
Author Heading: Kamijo, Yoshio
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040453972
Masuda, Takehito
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080725060
Uemura, Hiroshi
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000010710189
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2019-10
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2019-10
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1064
Volume: 1064
Pages: 1-14
ISSN (Periodical Title): PISSN : 0473453X
EISSN : 24350982
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: audit rule
tax evasion
laboratory experiment
cut-off rule
lowest income reporter audited rule
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We employed a game-theoretic framework to formulate and analyze a number of tax audit rules, especially the lowest income reporter audited rule. We explicitly considered the auditor’s resource constraint to choose one target from a continuous type of taxpayer. We then tested the theoretical predictions in a laboratory experiment, using three audit rules: the random, cut-off, and lowest income reporter audited rules. While the cut-off rule is known to be optimal in theory, it has not thus far been examined in a controlled laboratory experimental setting. Contrary to the theory, the lowest income reporter audited rule increased average compliance behavior significantly more compared with the optimal cut-off rule and, especially, the random rule. This holds with and without controlling the subjects’ demographics and attitudes regarding tax payment. This finding is practically important because the tax authorities in most countries assign higher priority to enhancing tax compliance.
References (URI): https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2019/DP1064.pdf
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2019/DP1064.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華