Connecting Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Aoyagi, Masaki

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2020-06

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: This paper studies the problem of a monopolistic platform which offers agents connection with one another. Agents have heterogeneous characteristics t...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Connecting Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information
Author/Editor: Aoyagi, Masaki
Author Heading: Aoyagi, Masaki
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050314430
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2020-06
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2020-06
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1089
Volume: 1089
Pages: 1-28
ISSN (Periodical Title): PISSN : 0473453X
EISSN : 24350982
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: platform
network externalities
random graph
revenue maximization
strategy-proof
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): This paper studies the problem of a monopolistic platform which offers agents connection with one another. Agents have heterogeneous characteristics that are valued by some other agents and observed privately by the principal. The agents are privately informed about their heterogeneous preferences over the characteristics of the other agents. The platform solicits information from the agents about their preferences and then offers an allocation that consists of groups of connected agents and subscription fees. We study mechanisms which induce truthful reporting and acceptance of the proposed allocation as a unique equilibrium outcome. We identify asymptotically optimal mechanisms which fully extract the agents’ informational rents in the limit as the market becomes large.
References (URI): URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2020/DP1089.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華