Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation with money : (Non)decreasing marginal valuations without quasi-linearity

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Shinozaki, Hirokiほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2020-08

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible object among agents and collecting payments. Each agent can receive multiple un...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation with money : (Non)decreasing marginal valuations without quasi-linearity
Author/Editor: Shinozaki, Hiroki
Kazumura, Tomoya
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Author Heading: Shinozaki, Hiroki
Kazumura, Tomoya
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050804960
Serizawa, Shigehiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090252717
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2020-08
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2020-08
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1097
Volume: 1097
Pages: 1-38
ISSN (Periodical Title): PISSN : 0473453X
EISSN : 24350982
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Efficiency
Strategy-proofness
Non-quasi-linear preferences
Nondecreasing marginal valuations
Decreasing marginal valuations
Constant marginal valuations
Multi-unit auctions
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible object among agents and collecting payments. Each agent can receive multiple units of the object, and his (consumption) bundle is a pair of the units he receives and his payment. An agent's preference over bundles may be non-quasi-linear, which accommodates income effects or soft budget constraints. We show that the generalized Vickrey rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers on rich domains with nondecreasing marginal valuations. We further show that if a domain is minimally rich and includes an arbitrary preference exhibiting both decreasing marginal valuations and a positive income effect, then no rule satisfies the same four properties. Our results suggest that in non-quasi-linear environments, the design of an efficient multi-unit auction mechanism is possible only when agents have nondecreasing marginal valuations.
References (URI): http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2020/DP1097.pdf
URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2020/DP1097.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華