Multi-Player Bayesian Learning with Misspecified Models

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Murooka, Takeshiほか

Publisher: Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

Publication date: 2021-01-15

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We consider strategic players who may have a misspecified view about an environment, and investigate their long-run behavior. Each period, players sim...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Multi-Player Bayesian Learning with Misspecified Models
Author/Editor: Murooka, Takeshi
Yamamoto, Yuichi
Author Heading: Murooka, Takeshi
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000010796345
Yamamoto, Yuichi
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040855178
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2021-01-15
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2021-01-15
Periodical title: OSIPP Discussion Paper
No. or year of volume/issue: DP-2021-E-001
Volume: DP-2021-E-001
Pages: 1-112
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: model misspecification
learning
convergence
overconfidence
bias transmission
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We consider strategic players who may have a misspecified view about an environment, and investigate their long-run behavior. Each period, players simultaneously take actions, observe a public outcome, and then update own belief about an uncertain economic state by using Bayes’ rule. We provide a condition under which players’ beliefs and actions converge to a steady state, and then characterize how one’s misspecification influences the long-run (steady-state) actions. When a player has a biased view about the physical environment (e.g., overconfidence on own capability or prejudice on an opponent’s capability), the presence of strategic interaction influences the size of the impact of misspecification, but not the direction. In particular, when the game is symmetric, the presence of strategic interaction amplifies the deviation of the long-run actions from those in the correctly specified model. When a player misspecifies the opponent’s view about the environment (e.g., the player is not aware of the opponent’s bias), the strategic interaction generates a directional impact for the long-run actions. We extensively discuss implications to a variety of applications, such as Cournot duopoly, team production, tournaments, and discrimination.
References (URI): http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2021/DP2021E001.pdf
URI
http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2021/DP2021E001.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華