Electoral Commitment in Asymmetric Tax-competition Models

Material type: 規格・テクニカルリポート類

Author: Nishimura, Yukihiroほか

Publisher: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

Publication date: 2021-07

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: * Revised： [20-21 , 2020]This study examines the political process of tax competition among asymmetric countries, highlighting the role of the commitm...

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Paper

Material Type: 規格・テクニカルリポート類
Title: Electoral Commitment in Asymmetric Tax-competition Models
Author/Editor: Nishimura, Yukihiro
Terai, Kimiko
Author Heading: Nishimura, Yukihiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090345471
Terai, Kimiko
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080350213
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2021-07
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2021
Periodical title: Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
No. or year of volume/issue: 20-21-Rev.
Volume: 20-21-Rev.
Pages: 1-22
Subject Heading: Capital-tax competition
Election campaign promises
Asymmetric countries
Voting
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): * Revised： [20-21 , 2020]
This study examines the political process of tax competition among asymmetric countries, highlighting the role of the commitment to the electoral promises.The median voters deliberately elect a delegate whose preferences differ from their own (strategic delegation), which is self-enforcing under symmetric countries. We first show that the outcome of strategic delegation is replicated when the candidates do not make binding campaign promises in both countries, and the opposite scenario of the binding commitments to the platforms leads to the self-representation by the median voters. We then amplify the model by adding the pre-election stage where the citizens choose whether the credibility of election promises is critical, through subscription numbers of newspapers and social media which determine the cost of betrayal of the proposed platforms (or the lack of the proposal). We then show that, depending on the type of asymmetries under consideration, sufficient asymmetry or sufficiently equal income distribution generates the commitment to the election campaign promises as the equilibrium outcome.
Periodical Title (NCID): AA1160366X
https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/AA1160366X
References (URI): comment:URI
http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/2021R.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華