Beliefs in Repeated Games

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Aoyagi, Masakiほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2021-02

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated p...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Beliefs in Repeated Games
Author/Editor: Aoyagi, Masaki
Fréchette, Guillaume R.
Yuksel, Sevgi
Author Heading: Aoyagi, Masaki
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050314430
Fréchette, Guillaume R.
Yuksel, Sevgi
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2021-02
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2021-02
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1119
Volume: 1119
Pages: 1-38
ISSN (Periodical Title): PISSN : 0473453X
EISSN : 24350982
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: repeated game
belief
strategy
elicitation
prisoner's dilemma
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games. We find subjects' beliefs about the other player's action are accurate despite some systematic deviations corresponding to early pessimism in the indefinitely repeated game and late optimism in the finitely repeated game. The data reveals a close link between beliefs and actions that diers between the two games. In particular, the same history of play leads to dierent beliefs, and the same belief leads to different action choices in each game. Moreover, we find beliefs anticipate the evolution of behavior within a supergame, changing in response to the history of play (in both games) and the number of rounds played (in the finitely repeated game). We then use the subjects' beliefs over actions in each round to identify their beliefs over supergame strategies played by the other player. We find these beliefs correctly capture the different classes of strategies used in each game. Importantly, subjects using different strategies have dierent beliefs, and for the most part, strategies are subjectively rational given beliefs. The results also suggest subjects tend to overestimate the likelihood that others use the same strategy as them, while underestimating the likelihood that others use less cooperative strategies.
References (URI): https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2021/DP1119.pdf
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2021/DP1119.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華