Competition Between Physical and Electronic Content Retailers

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Kittaka, Yutaほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2021-03

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We investigate a model in which a monopoly supplier distributes two types of its product through a traditional retailer with a wholesale price contrac...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Competition Between Physical and Electronic Content Retailers
Author/Editor: Kittaka, Yuta
Matsushima, Noriaki
Saruta, Fuyuki
Author Heading: Kittaka, Yuta
Matsushima, Noriaki
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080334879
Saruta, Fuyuki
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2021-03
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2021-03
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1123
Volume: 1123
Pages: 1-25
ISSN (Periodical Title): PISSN : 0473453X
EISSN : 24350982
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Agency contract
Price–quantity competition
Dual-channel supply chain
Royalty rate
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We investigate a model in which a monopoly supplier distributes two types of its product through a traditional retailer with a wholesale price contract and an online retailer with an agency contract. Because such an agency contract eliminates the double marginalization problem, the online retailer has a cost advantage over the traditional retailer. Given the advantage of the online retailer, we also consider a possible request by the traditional retailer: the retail price of the online retailer is not smaller than the wholesale price for the traditional retailer. We obtain the following results. An increase in the online retailer’s bargaining power over the supplier benefits the two retailers but harms the supplier. Under the request to protect the traditional retailer, the wholesale price is strictly higher than that in the baseline model. The retailers’ equilibrium prices are also strictly higher than those in the baseline model. The request benefits the supplier and the online retailer, but harms the traditional retailer.
References (URI): URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2021/DP1123.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華