Inequality aversion with general payoff function

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Kawanaka, Daijiro

Publisher: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

Publication date: 2021-06

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: In the existing axiomatic models of inequity aversion, players have linear payoff functions, so they can predict that a dictator chooses only a comple...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Inequality aversion with general payoff function
Author/Editor: Kawanaka, Daijiro
Author Heading: Kawanaka, Daijiro
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2021-06
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2021-06
Periodical title: Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
No. or year of volume/issue: 21-09
Volume: 21-09
Pages: 1-6
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Inequality aversion under risk
Maxmin expected utility
Social preferences
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): In the existing axiomatic models of inequity aversion, players have linear payoff functions, so they can predict that a dictator chooses only a completely selfish or completely fair offer in dictator games. However, experimental literature documents that a significantly amount of dictators offers 20-30% of the total pie to the passive opponent. This note, in contrast, ax-iomatizes inequity averse representation with general payoff function, so that we can explain such interior choices.
References (URI): http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/2109.pdf
URI
http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/2109.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華