Misspecified Bayesian Learning by Strategic Players : First-Order Misspecification and Higher-Order Misspecification

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Murooka, Takeshiほか

Publisher: Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

Publication date: 2021-12-02

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We consider strategic players who may have a misspecified view about the world, and investigate their long-run behavior when they learn an unknown sta...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Misspecified Bayesian Learning by Strategic Players : First-Order Misspecification and Higher-Order Misspecification
Author/Editor: Murooka, Takeshi
Yamamoto, Yuichi
Author Heading: Murooka, Takeshi
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000010796345
Yamamoto, Yuichi
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040855178
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2021-12-02
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2021-12-02
Periodical title: OSIPP Discussion Paper
No. or year of volume/issue: DP-2021-E-008
Volume: DP-2021-E-008
Pages: 1-96
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: model misspecification
learning
convergence
overconfidence
bias transmission
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We consider strategic players who may have a misspecified view about the world, and investigate their long-run behavior when they learn an unknown state from public signals over time. Our framework is flexible and allows for higher-order misspecification, in that a player may have a bias about the physical environment, a bias about the opponent's bias about the physical environment, and so on. We provide a condition under which players' beliefs and actions converge to a steady state, and then characterize how one's misspecification influences the long-run (steady-state) outcome. We apply these results to various economic examples such as Cournot competition, team production, and discrimination. We find that higher-order misspecification can have a significant impact on the equilibrium outcome: One's overconfidence can have opposite effects on the equilibrium outcome, depending on whether the opponent is aware of this bias or not.
References (URI): URI
http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2021/DP2021E008.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華