Social Learning and Strategic Pricing with Rating Systems

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Chen, Chia-Huiほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2023-03

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: Despite widespread use in online transactions, rating systems only provide summary statistics of buyers’ diverse opinions at best. To investigate the ...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Social Learning and Strategic Pricing with Rating Systems
Author/Editor: Chen, Chia-Hui
Chen, Kong-Pin
Ishida, Junichiro
Author Heading: Chen, Chia-Hui
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000020768238
Chen, Kong-Pin
Ishida, Junichiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040324222
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2023-03
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2023-03
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1203
Volume: 1203
Pages: 1-41
ISSN (Periodical Title): PISSN : 0473453X
EISSN : 24350982
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: online platform
rating system
anonymity
preference diversity
price fluctuation
dynamic adverse selection
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): Despite widespread use in online transactions, rating systems only provide summary statistics of buyers’ diverse opinions at best. To investigate the consequences of this coarse form of information aggregation, we consider a dynamic lemons market in which buyers share their evaluations anonymously through a rating system. When the buyers have diverse preferences, the value of a good rating depends endogenously on the seller’s pricing strategy, which in turn creates complicated dynamic interactions and results in stochastic price fluctuations. Occasional flash sales induced by the rating system yield a non-trivial welfare effect that stands in sharp contrast to standard adverse selection models: all buyers are weakly better off with information asymmetry than without. Incentivizing buyers to leave ratings may backfire by exacerbating the seller’s strategic pricing incentives.
References (URI): URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2023/DP1203.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華