An Experiment on a Dynamic Beauty Contest Game

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Hanaki, Nobuyukiほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2023-09

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We present and conduct a novel experiment on a dynamic beauty contest game motivated by the canonical New-Keynesian model. Participants continuously p...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: An Experiment on a Dynamic Beauty Contest Game
Author/Editor: Hanaki, Nobuyuki
Takahashi, Yuta
Author Heading: Hanaki, Nobuyuki
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000070400611
Takahashi, Yuta
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000010835747
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2023-09
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2023-09
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1213
Volume: 1213
Pages: 1-39
ISSN (Periodical Title): PISSN : 0473453X
EISSN : 24350982
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Expectation formation
Learning-to-forecast experiment
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We present and conduct a novel experiment on a dynamic beauty contest game motivated by the canonical New-Keynesian model. Participants continuously provide forecasts for prices spanning multiple future periods. These forecasts determine the price for the current period and participants’ payoffs. Our findings are threefold. First, the observed prices in the experiment deviate more from the rational expectations equilibrium prices under strategic complementarity than under strategic substitution. Second, participants’ expectations respond to announcements of future shocks on average. Finally, participants employ heuristics in their forecasting; however, the choice of heuristic varies with the degree of strategic complementarity.
References (URI): https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2023/DP1213.pdf
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2023/DP1213.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華