An implementation of constrained efficient allocations in hidden information economies

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Wakabayashi, Yuya

Publisher: Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

Publication date: 2024-05-24

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We examine a simple hidden information economy with a single agent, multiple identical firms, and two goods. The agent’s states are unknown to the fir...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: An implementation of constrained efficient allocations in hidden information economies
Author/Editor: Wakabayashi, Yuya
Author Heading: Wakabayashi, Yuya
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2024-05-24
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2024-05-24
Periodical title: OSIPP Discussion Paper
No. or year of volume/issue: DP-2024-E-002
Volume: DP-2024-E-002
Pages: 1-11
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Asymmetric information
Constrained efficiency
Nash implementation
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We examine a simple hidden information economy with a single agent, multiple identical firms, and two goods. The agent’s states are unknown to the firms. The game unfolds in two stages: in the first stage, firms offer a menu of allocations, and in the second stage, the agent selects her preferred allocation from the offered allocations. We show that, in almost all cases, the constrained efficient allocation cannot be implemented by a subgame perfect equilibrium in the game.
References (URI): https://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2024/DP2024E002.pdf
URI
https://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2024/DP2024E002.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華