Optimal Feedback Dynamics Against Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Chen, Chia-Huiほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2024-07

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We consider a dynamic model in which a principal decides what information to release about a product of unknown quality (e.g., a vaccine) to incentivi...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Optimal Feedback Dynamics Against Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation
Author/Editor: Chen, Chia-Hui
Eraslan, Hülya
Ishida, Junichiro
Yamashita, Takuro
Author Heading: Chen, Chia-Hui
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000020768238
Eraslan, Hülya
Ishida, Junichiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040324222
Yamashita, Takuro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050928728
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2024-07
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2024-07
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1247
Volume: 1247
Pages: 1-38
ISSN (Periodical Title): PISSN : 0473453X
EISSN : 24350982
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: strategic experimentation
information design
free-rider problem
social learning
COVID-19 pandemic
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We consider a dynamic model in which a principal decides what information to release about a product of unknown quality (e.g., a vaccine) to incentivize agents to experiment with the product. Assuming that the agents are long-lived and forward-looking, their incentive to wait and see other agents’ experiences poses a significant obstacle to social learning. We show that the optimal feedback mechanism to mitigate information free-riding takes a strikingly simple form: the principal recommends adoption as long as she observes no bad news, but only with some probability; once she does not recommend at some point, she stays silent forever after that. Our analysis suggests the optimality of premature termination, which in turn implies that: (i) false positives (termination in the good state) are more acceptable than false negatives (continuation in the bad state); (ii) overly cautious mechanisms that are biased toward termination can be welfare-enhancing.
References (URI): URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2024/DP1247.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華