Optimal Dynamic Pricing under Network Externalities

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Hirano, Seiya

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2024-11

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: This paper studies the relationship between optimal dynamic pricing for network goods and the coor-dination of consumers’ adoption decisions. We show ...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Optimal Dynamic Pricing under Network Externalities
Author/Editor: Hirano, Seiya
Author Heading: Hirano, Seiya
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2024-11
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2024-11
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1267
Volume: 1267
Pages: 1-28
ISSN (Periodical Title): PISSN : 0473453X
EISSN : 24350982
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Network Externalities
Dynamic Pricing
Coordination Game
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): This paper studies the relationship between optimal dynamic pricing for network goods and the coor-dination of consumers’ adoption decisions. We show that based on risk dominance criterion, consumers face the risk of coordination failure, and introductory pricing is optimal if the risk is higher in period 1 without network. We find that under threshold coordination, the impact of price on the network size varies according to consumer beliefs. In pessimistic (optimistic) threshold coordination, the network size expands (shrinks) as the price increases. Lowering (Raising) the price in period 2 implies a smaller network size, so introductory (skim) pricing is optimal.
References (URI): URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2024/DP1267.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華