Political Economy of Non-Compliance with the Golden Rule of Public Finance

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Uchida, Yukiほか

Publisher: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

Publication date: 2025-01

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: This study examines the limitations of political equilibrium in fiscal policy formation by short-sighted governments that represent only the currently...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Political Economy of Non-Compliance with the Golden Rule of Public Finance
Author/Editor: Uchida, Yuki
Ono, Tetsuo
Author Heading: Uchida, Yuki
Ono, Tetsuo
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050305661
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2025-01
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2025-01
Periodical title: Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
No. or year of volume/issue: 25-01
Volume: 25-01
Pages: 1-48
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Fiscal Rule
Golden Rule of Public Finance
Probabilistic Voting
Overlapping Generations
Political Distortions
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): This study examines the limitations of political equilibrium in fiscal policy formation by short-sighted governments that represent only the currently living generations, as compared to an allocation determined by a long-lived planner who values both current and future generations. Using an overlapping-generations model calibrated to Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, we evaluate the role of the Golden Rule of Public Finance (GR), which restricts deficit financing to public investment. The findings reveal that (i) reduced GR compliance shifts fiscal burdens from middle-aged voters to future generations and older adults, resulting in spillover effects; (ii) GR compliance is significantly influenced by the elasticity of public capital to investment, preferences for public goods, and GDP growth rates; and (iii) non-compliance with the GR causes political equilibrium to diverge from the planner’s optimal allocation.
References (URI): URI
https://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/2501.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華