A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement

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Summary, etc.：: In this paper, we explore a dynamic theory of investment and costly managerial turnover given agency conflicts between the firm manager and investors....

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Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement
Author/Editor: Hori, Keiichi
Osano, Hiroshi
Author Heading: Hori, Keiichi
Osano, Hiroshi
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University
Publication Date: 2015-02
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2015-02
Periodical title: KIER Discussion Paper
No. or year of volume/issue: 921
Volume: 921
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: average q
CEO turnover
continuous-time agency model
investment
marginal q
NDC: 330
Target Audience: 一般
Format (IMT): application/pdf
Source: DP921.pdf （fulltext）
http://repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/197268/3/DP921.pdf
Access Restrictions: インターネット公開
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 京都大学 : 京都大学学術情報リポジトリ