Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "Bao (Contract)" and "Bisai (Contest)" : A Contract Theory Analysis

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: SUZUKI, Yutaka

Publisher: Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University

Publication date: 2015-01-14

Material Format: Digital

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Note (General)：: type:Working PaperWe use a contract theory/mechanism design framework to analyze the fiscal relations and reforms between the Central and Local govern...

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HOSEI UNIVERSITY REPOSITORY
Digital
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HOSEI UNIVERSITY REPOSITORY

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Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "Bao (Contract)" and "Bisai (Contest)" : A Contract Theory Analysis
Author/Editor: SUZUKI, Yutaka
Author Heading: SUZUKI, Yutaka
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University
Publication Date: 2015-01-14
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2015-01-14
Periodical title: 比較経済研究所ワーキングペーパー
No. or year of volume/issue: 189
Volume: 189
Pages: 1-35
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Fiscal Contracting
Tax Sharing
Adverse Selection
Mechanism Design
Yardstick Competition
Ratchet Effect
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): type:Working Paper
We use a contract theory/mechanism design framework to analyze the fiscal relations and reforms between the Central and Local governments in China, which are said to have made great contributions to economic growth since the “Economic Reform”. First, we present the mechanism (a fiscal incentive contract model), which has created incentives for the development agent (Local government), and clarify theoretically how the concept of “Bao (Contract)” works. We then comprehend the concept of “Bisai (Contest)” within the framework of the yardstick competition between Local governments, and review the mechanism which encourages proper information revelation through intergovernmental comparison and competition. Lastly, we make a theoretical comparative analysis on the fiscal system reform (from the Fiscal Contracting system to the Tax Sharing system), from the perspective of how much room was left for the “Ratchet Effect” in the dynamic relation between the Central and Local governments, and how it was solved (or mitigated) in the two fiscal systems.
Source: https://hosei.ecats-library.jp//da/repository/00010568/189suzuki.pdf
https://hosei.ecats-library.jp//da/repository/00010568/189suzuki.pdf
Access Restrictions: 限定公開
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 法政大学 : 法政大学学術機関リポジトリ