Centralization, Decentralization and Incentive Problems in Eurozone Financial Governance : A Contract Theory Analysis

• Material Type: 文書・図像類
• Title: Centralization, Decentralization and Incentive Problems in Eurozone Financial Governance : A Contract Theory Analysis
• Author/Editor: SUZUKI, Yutaka; 鈴木, 豊
• Author Heading: SUZUKI, Yutaka; 鈴木, 豊; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000020277693/
• Publication, Distribution, etc.: Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University
• Publication Date: 2013-03-11
• Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2013-03-11
• Periodical title: 比較経済研究所ワーキングペーパー
• No. or year of volume/issue: 170
• Volume: 170
• Pages: 1-35
• Text Language Code: eng
• Subject Heading: Stability and Growth Pact; Monetary Centralization; Fiscal Decentralization; Free-Rider Problem; Penalty Schemes and Renegotiation; Authority Allocation Structure; Relative Sovereignty
• Target Audience: 一般
• Format (IMT): application/pdf
• Source: 170suzuki.pdf （fulltext）; https://hosei.ecats-library.jp/da/repository/00008776/170suzuki.pdf
• Access Restrictions: 限定公開
• Related Material: inSeries
• Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• Original Data Provider (Database): 法政大学 : 法政大学学術機関リポジトリ

• Summary, etc.: We use a Contract Theory framework to analyze the mechanisms of Eurozone financial governance through the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), with a focu...