Immediately Reactive Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs

• Material Type: 文書・図像類
• Title: Immediately Reactive Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs
• Author/Editor: 上東, 貴志; 古澤, 泰治
• Author Heading: 上東, 貴志; 古澤, 泰治
• Publication, Distribution, etc.: Graduate School of Economics and Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
• Publication Date: 2008-03
• Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2008-03
• Contributor: 現代経済システムの規範的評価と社会的選択 = Center for Excellence Project The Normative Evaluation and Social Choice of Contemporary Economic Systems
• Text Language Code: eng
• Target Audience: 一般
• Note (General): 21世紀COEプログラム = 21st-Century COE Program
• Format (IMT): application/pdf
• Source: fulltext; https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/16329/070resDP_251.pdf
• Access Restrictions: インターネット公開
• Periodical Title: COE-RES Discussion Paper Series ; No. 251
• Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• Original Data Provider (Database): 一橋大学 : HERMES-IR(一橋大学機関リポジトリ) : Research & Education Resources

• Summary, etc.: This paper studies a class of in￣nitely repeated games with two players in which the action space of each player is an interval, and the one- shot pay...