Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory

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Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory

Publisher: Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University

Notes on use

Note (General)：: First Version: March 18, 2016 ; Current Version: April 14, 2016

Detailed bibliographic record

Summary, etc.：: We experimentally examine repeated prisoners' dilemma with random termination, where monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates tha...

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Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory
Author/Editor: 萱場, 豊
MATSUSHIMA, Hitoshi
TOYAMA, Tomohisa
Author Heading: 萱場, 豊
MATSUSHIMA, Hitoshi
TOYAMA, Tomohisa
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University
Publication Date: 2016-03-18
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2016-03-18
Contributor: Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Imperfect Private Monitoring
Experiments
Generous Tit-For-Tat
Behavioral Model
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): First Version: March 18, 2016 ; Current Version: April 14, 2016
Format (IMT): application/pdf
Source: fulltext
https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/27961/070_hiasDP-E-23.pdf
Access Restrictions: インターネット公開
Periodical Title: Discussion paper series ; No. HIAS-E-23
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 一橋大学 : HERMES-IR(一橋大学機関リポジトリ) : Research & Education Resources