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Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
Paper文書・図像類
Kazumura, Tomoya, Mishra, Debasis, Serizawa, ShigehiroThe Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University2020-01Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers1001p.1-55
Other Libraries in Japan
  • Subject Heading...ces no wastage equal treatment of equals
  • Note (General)...tionality, (3) equal treatment of equals, (4) no wastage (every object...

Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Non-Quasilinear Preferences: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization for an Arbitrary Number of Objects

Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Non-Quasilinear Preferences: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization for an Arbitrary Number of Objects
Paper文書・図像類
Sakai, Ryosuke, Serizawa, ShigehiroThe Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University2020-10Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers1107p.1-16
Other Libraries in Japan
  • Subject Heading...ear preference Equal treatment of equals Non-wastefulness
  • Note (General)...-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Exte...

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