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Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
Paper文書・図像類
Kazumura, Tomoya, Mishra, Debasis, Serizawa, ShigehiroThe Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University2020-01Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers1001p.1-55
Other Libraries in Japan
  • Subject Heading...tegy-proofness ex-post revenue maximization minimum Walrasian equilibrium...

Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Non-Quasilinear Preferences: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization for an Arbitrary Number of Objects

Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Non-Quasilinear Preferences: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization for an Arbitrary Number of Objects
Paper文書・図像類
Sakai, Ryosuke, Serizawa, ShigehiroThe Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University2020-10Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers1107p.1-16
Other Libraries in Japan
  • Subject Heading...tegy-proofness Ex-post revenue maximization Minimum price Walrasian rule ...

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