書店で探す
全国の図書館の所蔵
国立国会図書館以外の全国の図書館の所蔵状況を表示します。
所蔵のある図書館から取寄せることが可能かなど、資料の利用方法は、ご自身が利用されるお近くの図書館へご相談ください
書店で探す
書誌情報
この資料の詳細や典拠(同じ主題の資料を指すキーワード、著者名)等を確認できます。
- 資料種別
- 文書・図像類
- 著者・編者
- 黒坂,真 / 宋,仁守
- 著者標目
- 本文の言語コード
- eng
- 対象利用者
- 一般
- 一般注記
- type:80 大阪経大学会「Working Paper」This paper provides a theoretical model to describe the prospects to end a civil war and to get out from the poverty trap in the region in which a rebel aims to appropriate a dictator's natural resource rents. The main protagonists are the dictator, the people, and the rebel. The dictator, who governs the formal sector of the economy, compels the people to contribute their labor to production and to defend the natural resource rents. The rebel is assumed to live in a remote area such as a mountain side, which is part of the informal sector. One of our results indicates that if the productivity in the informal sector is sufficiently low or if the natural resource rents are sufficiently high, the rebel allocates all the labor to predation. In this case, the dictator may induce people to allocate some of their labor in order to defend the natural resource rents, thus causing a severe conflict, which can be considered as a poverty trap. An increase in the natural resource rents due to factors such as the discovery of a rare natural resource intensifies the conflict intensity in this case. We interpret the conflict intensity as a typical indicator of poverty trap because a civil war inevitably destructs an economy and people‟s life. Our result suggests that foreign aid that improves the productivity in the informal sector or reinforcing the relative strength of the defense by the dictator‟s side may contribute to end a civil war. Some numerical examples are presented in the last section in order to illustrate the structure of our model.
- 一次資料へのリンクURL
- http://www.i-repository.net/il/user_contents/02/G0000031Repository/workingpaper/wp2009-3.pdf
- オンライン閲覧公開範囲
- 限定公開