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A Poverty Trap Caused by the Civil War over Natural Resource Rents

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A Poverty Trap Caused by the Civil War over Natural Resource Rents

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文書・図像類
Author
黒坂,真 / 宋,仁守
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type:80 大阪経大学会「Working Paper」This paper provides a theoretical model to describe the prospects to end a civil war and to get out from the poverty trap...

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Material Type
文書・図像類
Author/Editor
黒坂,真 / 宋,仁守
Text Language Code
eng
Target Audience
一般
Note (General)
type:80 大阪経大学会「Working Paper」
This paper provides a theoretical model to describe the prospects to end a civil war and to get out from the poverty trap in the region in which a rebel aims to appropriate a dictator's natural resource rents. The main protagonists are the dictator, the people, and the rebel. The dictator, who governs the formal sector of the economy, compels the people to contribute their labor to production and to defend the natural resource rents. The rebel is assumed to live in a remote area such as a mountain side, which is part of the informal sector. One of our results indicates that if the productivity in the informal sector is sufficiently low or if the natural resource rents are sufficiently high, the rebel allocates all the labor to predation. In this case, the dictator may induce people to allocate some of their labor in order to defend the natural resource rents, thus causing a severe conflict, which can be considered as a poverty trap. An increase in the natural resource rents due to factors such as the discovery of a rare natural resource intensifies the conflict intensity in this case. We interpret the conflict intensity as a typical indicator of poverty trap because a civil war inevitably destructs an economy and people‟s life. Our result suggests that foreign aid that improves the productivity in the informal sector or reinforcing the relative strength of the defense by the dictator‟s side may contribute to end a civil war. Some numerical examples are presented in the last section in order to illustrate the structure of our model.
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国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース(IRDB)(機関リポジトリ)