タイトル(掲載誌)Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
一般注記* Revised: [11-26, 2011]
* Revised: [11-26-Rev., 2013]
This paper introduces an overlapping-generations model with earnings hetero-geneity and borrowing constraints. The labor income tax and the allocation of tax revenue between social security and forward intergenerational public goods are determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game played by successive gen-erations. The political equilibrium is characterized by an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium where low- and high-income individuals form a coalition in favor of a lower tax rate and less social security while middle-income individuals favor a higher tax rate and greater social security. Government spending then shifts from social security to public goods provision if higher wage inequality is associated with the borrowing constraint and a high elasticity of marginal utility of youthful consump-tion.
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース(IRDB)(機関リポジトリ)