Old-age Social Security vs. Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Arawatari, Ryoほか

Publisher: Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University

Publication date: 2013-08

Material Format: Paper

Capacity, size, etc.: -

NDC: -

View All

Notes on use

Note (General)：: * Revised： [11-26, 2011]* Revised： [11-26-Rev., 2013]This paper introduces an overlapping-generations model with earnings hetero-geneity and borrowing...

Search by Bookstore

Holdings of Libraries in Japan

This page shows libraries in Japan other than the National Diet Library that hold the material.

List of Cooperating Institutions and Databases

Please contact your local library for information on how to use materials or whether it is possible to request materials from the holding libraries.

other

OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive)
Paper
You can check the holdings of institutions and databases with which Institutional Repositories DataBase(IRDB)(Institutional Repository) is linked at the site of Institutional Repositories DataBase(IRDB)(Institutional Repository).
OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive)

Search by Bookstore

Bibliographic Record

You can check the details of this material, its authority (keywords that refer to materials on the same subject, author's name, etc.), etc.

Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Old-age Social Security vs. Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision
Author/Editor: Arawatari, Ryo
Ono, Tetsuo
Author Heading: Arawatari, Ryo
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000020547335
Ono, Tetsuo
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050305661
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
Publication Date: 2013-08
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2013-08
Periodical title: Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
No. or year of volume/issue: 11-26-Rev.2
Volume: 11-26-Rev.2
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Borrowing constraint
Old-age social security
Forward intergenera- tional public goods
Ends-against-the-middle equilibrium
Wage inequality
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): * Revised： [11-26, 2011]
* Revised： [11-26-Rev., 2013]
This paper introduces an overlapping-generations model with earnings hetero-geneity and borrowing constraints. The labor income tax and the allocation of tax revenue between social security and forward intergenerational public goods are determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game played by successive gen-erations. The political equilibrium is characterized by an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium where low- and high-income individuals form a coalition in favor of a lower tax rate and less social security while middle-income individuals favor a higher tax rate and greater social security. Government spending then shifts from social security to public goods provision if higher wage inequality is associated with the borrowing constraint and a high elasticity of marginal utility of youthful consump-tion.
Periodical Title (NCID): AA1160366X
https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/AA1160366X
References (URI): URI
http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1126R2.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華