Who benefits from resale-below-cost laws?

• 資料種別: 文書・図像類
• タイトル: Who benefits from resale-below-cost laws?
• 著者・編者: Matsushima, Noriaki; Miyaoka, Akira
• 著者標目: Matsushima, Noriaki; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080334879; Miyaoka, Akira
• 出版事項: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
• 出版年月日等: 2013-06-09
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2013-06-09
• タイトル（掲載誌）: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
• 巻号年月日等（掲載誌）: 875
• 掲載巻: 875
• 掲載ページ: 1-46
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 件名標目: Loss-leader Pricing; Channel Power; Vertical Relations
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 一般注記: We investigate the effect of banning resale-below-cost offers. There are two retailers with heterogeneous bargaining positions in relation to a monopolistic manufacturer. Each retailer sells two goods: one procured from the monopolistic manufacturer and the other, from a competitive fringe. In equilibrium, banning resale-below-cost offers can decrease the retailers’prices. The ban can benefit the weak retailer in terms of bargaining position and increase the total consumer surplus, although it harms the dominant retailer and the monopolistic manufacturer. Contrary to the basic scenario, when the weak retailer is horizontally separated, the ban benefits the monopolistic manufacturer.
• 参照（URI）: URI; http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0875.pdf
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• 提供元機関・データベース: 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫 桜華