Who beneﬁts from resale-below-cost laws?

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Matsushima, Noriakiほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2013-06-09

Material Format: Paper

Capacity, size, etc.: -

NDC: -

View All

Notes on use

Note (General)：: We investigate the effect of banning resale-below-cost offers. There are two retailers with heterogeneous bargaining positions in relation to a monopo...

Search by Bookstore

Holdings of Libraries in Japan

This page shows libraries in Japan other than the National Diet Library that hold the material.

List of Cooperating Institutions and Databases

Please contact your local library for information on how to use materials or whether it is possible to request materials from the holding libraries.

other

OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive)
Paper
You can check the holdings of institutions and databases with which Institutional Repositories DataBase(IRDB)(Institutional Repository) is linked at the site of Institutional Repositories DataBase(IRDB)(Institutional Repository).
OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive)

Search by Bookstore

Bibliographic Record

You can check the details of this material, its authority (keywords that refer to materials on the same subject, author's name, etc.), etc.

Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Who beneﬁts from resale-below-cost laws?
Author/Editor: Matsushima, Noriaki
Miyaoka, Akira
Author Heading: Matsushima, Noriaki
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080334879
Miyaoka, Akira
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2013-06-09
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2013-06-09
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 875
Volume: 875
Pages: 1-46
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Loss-leader Pricing
Channel Power
Vertical Relations
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We investigate the effect of banning resale-below-cost offers. There are two retailers with heterogeneous bargaining positions in relation to a monopolistic manufacturer. Each retailer sells two goods: one procured from the monopolistic manufacturer and the other, from a competitive fringe. In equilibrium, banning resale-below-cost offers can decrease the retailers’prices. The ban can beneﬁt the weak retailer in terms of bargaining position and increase the total consumer surplus, although it harms the dominant retailer and the monopolistic manufacturer. Contrary to the basic scenario, when the weak retailer is horizontally separated, the ban beneﬁts the monopolistic manufacturer.
References (URI): URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0875.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華