Patient Dumping, Outlier Payment, and Optimal Healthcare Payment Policy under Asymmetric Information

• 資料種別: 文書・図像類
• タイトル: Patient Dumping, Outlier Payment, and Optimal Healthcare Payment Policy under Asymmetric Information
• 著者・編者: Takahara, Tsuyoshi
• 著者標目: Takahara, Tsuyoshi; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000070844421
• 出版事項: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
• 出版年月日等: 2014-10
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2014-10
• タイトル（掲載誌）: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
• 巻号年月日等（掲載誌）: 891
• 掲載巻: 891
• 掲載ページ: 1-24
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 件名標目: Patient dumping; healthcare payment policy; adverse selection
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 一般注記: December 2013, Revised October 2014; We analyze a rationale for official authorization of patient dumping in the prospective payment policy framework. We show that when the insurer designs the healthcare payment policy to let hospitals dump high-cost patients, there is a trade-off between the disutility of dumped patients (changes in hospitals’ rent extraction due to low-severity patients) and the shift in the level of cost reduction efforts for high-severity patients.We also clarify the welfare-improving conditions by allowing hospitals to dump high-severity patients. Finally, we show that if the effciency of the cost reduction efforts varies extensively and the healthcare payment cost is substantial, or if there are many private hospitals, the patient dumping policy can improve social welfare in a wider environment.
• 参照（URI）: URI; https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0891R.pdf
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• 提供元機関・データベース: 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫 桜華