Patient Dumping, Outlier Payment, and Optimal Healthcare Payment Policy under Asymmetric Information

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Takahara, Tsuyoshi

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2014-10

Material Format: Paper

Capacity, size, etc.: -

NDC: -

View All

Notes on use

Note (General)：: December 2013, Revised October 2014We analyze a rationale for official authorization of patient dumping in the prospective payment policy framework. W...

Search by Bookstore

Holdings of Libraries in Japan

This page shows libraries in Japan other than the National Diet Library that hold the material.

List of Cooperating Institutions and Databases

Please contact your local library for information on how to use materials or whether it is possible to request materials from the holding libraries.

other

OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive)
Paper
You can check the holdings of institutions and databases with which Institutional Repositories DataBase(IRDB)(Institutional Repository) is linked at the site of Institutional Repositories DataBase(IRDB)(Institutional Repository).
OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive)

Search by Bookstore

Bibliographic Record

You can check the details of this material, its authority (keywords that refer to materials on the same subject, author's name, etc.), etc.

Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Patient Dumping, Outlier Payment, and Optimal Healthcare Payment Policy under Asymmetric Information
Author/Editor: Takahara, Tsuyoshi
Author Heading: Takahara, Tsuyoshi
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000070844421
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2014-10
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2014-10
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 891
Volume: 891
Pages: 1-24
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Patient dumping
healthcare payment policy
adverse selection
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): December 2013, Revised October 2014
We analyze a rationale for official authorization of patient dumping in the prospective payment policy framework. We show that when the insurer designs the healthcare payment policy to let hospitals dump high-cost patients, there is a trade-off between the disutility of dumped patients (changes in hospitals’ rent extraction due to low-severity patients) and the shift in the level of cost reduction efforts for high-severity patients.We also clarify the welfare-improving conditions by allowing hospitals to dump high-severity patients. Finally, we show that if the effciency of the cost reduction efforts varies extensively and the healthcare payment cost is substantial, or if there are many private hospitals, the patient dumping policy can improve social welfare in a wider environment.
References (URI): URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0891R.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華