Pre-negotiation commitment and internalization in public good provision through bilateral negotiations

• 資料種別: 文書・図像類
• タイトル: Pre-negotiation commitment and internalization in public good provision through bilateral negotiations
• 著者・編者: Matsushima, Noriaki; Shinohara, Ryusuke
• 著者標目: Matsushima, Noriaki; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080334879; Shinohara, Ryusuke; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040402094
• 出版事項: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
• 出版年月日等: 2017-08
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2017-08
• タイトル（掲載誌）: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
• 巻号年月日等（掲載誌）: 948
• 掲載巻: 948
• 掲載ページ: 1-x
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 件名標目: Public good; Simultaneous bilateral bargaining; Supplier bargaining power; Nash bargaining solution
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 一般注記: September 2015. Revised August 2017.; We investigate public good provision through bilateral negotiations between a public-good supplier and the beneficiaries of the good. We find that although a pre-negotiation commitment on the production level of the public good by the supplier enhances the internalization of beneficiaries' preferences, the good is not necessarily provided efficiently. We show that with the commitment, the supplier produces the public good at an efficient level in equilibrium if and only if its bargaining power is sufficiently weak. In addition, the public good may be produced excessively as a result of the commitment when the supplier's bargaining power is sufficiently strong.
• 参照（URI）: https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2015/DP0948R.pdf; URI
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• 提供元機関・データベース: 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫 桜華