Pre-negotiation commitment and internalization in public good provision through bilateral negotiations

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Matsushima, Noriakiほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2017-08

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: September 2015. Revised August 2017.We investigate public good provision through bilateral negotiations between a public-good supplier and the benefic...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Pre-negotiation commitment and internalization in public good provision through bilateral negotiations
Author/Editor: Matsushima, Noriaki
Shinohara, Ryusuke
Author Heading: Matsushima, Noriaki
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080334879
Shinohara, Ryusuke
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040402094
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2017-08
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2017-08
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 948
Volume: 948
Pages: 1-x
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Public good
Simultaneous bilateral bargaining
Supplier bargaining power
Nash bargaining solution
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): September 2015. Revised August 2017.
We investigate public good provision through bilateral negotiations between a public-good supplier and the beneficiaries of the good. We find that although a pre-negotiation commitment on the production level of the public good by the supplier enhances the internalization of beneficiaries' preferences, the good is not necessarily provided efficiently. We show that with the commitment, the supplier produces the public good at an efficient level in equilibrium if and only if its bargaining power is sufficiently weak. In addition, the public good may be produced excessively as a result of the commitment when the supplier's bargaining power is sufficiently strong.
References (URI): https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2015/DP0948R.pdf
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2015/DP0948R.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華