An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition

• 資料種別: 文書・図像類
• タイトル: An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition
• 著者・編者: Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Mukherjee, Arijit
• 著者標目: Chen, Chia-Hui; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000020768238; Ishida, Junichiro; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040324222; Mukherjee, Arijit
• 出版事項: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
• 出版年月日等: 2018-10-26
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2018-10-26
• タイトル（掲載誌）: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
• 巻号年月日等（掲載誌）: 1043
• 掲載巻: 1043
• 掲載ページ: 1-34
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 件名標目: market entry; market competition; private learning; signaling; entry timing
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 一般注記: This paper provides a dynamic game of market entry to illustrate entry dynamics in an uncertain market environment. Our model features both private learning about the market condition and market competition, which give rise to the first-mover and secondmover advantages in a unified framework. We characterize symmetric Markov perfect equilibria and identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the first-mover advantage to dominate, which elucidates when and under what conditions a firm becomes a pioneer, an early follower or a late entrant. We also derive equilibrium payoff bounds to show that pioneering entry is generally payoff-enhancing, even though it is driven by preemption motives, and discuss efficiency properties of entry dynamics.
• 参照（URI）: URI; http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2018/DP1043.pdf
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• 提供元機関・データベース: 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫 桜華