An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Chen, Chia-Huiほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2018-10-26

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: This paper provides a dynamic game of market entry to illustrate entry dynamics in an uncertain market environment. Our model features both private le...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition
Author/Editor: Chen, Chia-Hui
Ishida, Junichiro
Mukherjee, Arijit
Author Heading: Chen, Chia-Hui
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000020768238
Ishida, Junichiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040324222
Mukherjee, Arijit
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2018-10-26
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2018-10-26
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1043
Volume: 1043
Pages: 1-34
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: market entry
market competition
private learning
signaling
entry timing
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): This paper provides a dynamic game of market entry to illustrate entry dynamics in an uncertain market environment. Our model features both private learning about the market condition and market competition, which give rise to the first-mover and secondmover advantages in a unified framework. We characterize symmetric Markov perfect equilibria and identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the first-mover advantage to dominate, which elucidates when and under what conditions a firm becomes a pioneer, an early follower or a late entrant. We also derive equilibrium payoff bounds to show that pioneering entry is generally payoff-enhancing, even though it is driven by preemption motives, and discuss efficiency properties of entry dynamics.
References (URI): URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2018/DP1043.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華