A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : An experiment for the Vickrey auction

• 資料種別: 文書・図像類
• タイトル: A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : An experiment for the Vickrey auction
• 著者・編者: Masuda, Takehito; Sakai, Toyotaka; Serizawa, Shigehiro; Wakayama, Takuma
• 著者標目: Masuda, Takehito; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080725060; Sakai, Toyotaka; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050404976; Serizawa, Shigehiro; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090252717; Wakayama, Takuma; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080448654
• 出版事項: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
• 出版年月日等: 2019-11
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2019-11
• タイトル（掲載誌）: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
• 巻号年月日等（掲載誌）: 1048
• 掲載巻: 1048
• 掲載ページ: 1-88
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 件名標目: advice effect; strategy-proofness; Vickrey auction; pay-your-bid auction; market design
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 一般注記: January 2019. Revised November 2019.; We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, with and without advice, we find that our experimental results are not attributed to so-called experimenter demand effects. Strategy-proof mechanisms are sometimes criticized because players often fail to find the benefit of truth-telling, but our observations tell that introducing an educative announcement helps them behave“correctly.”
• 参照（URI）: URI; https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2019/DP1048R.pdf
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• 提供元機関・データベース: 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫 桜華