A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : An experiment for the Vickrey auction

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Masuda, Takehitoほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2019-11

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: January 2019. Revised November 2019.We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness t...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : An experiment for the Vickrey auction
Author/Editor: Masuda, Takehito
Sakai, Toyotaka
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Wakayama, Takuma
Author Heading: Masuda, Takehito
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080725060
Sakai, Toyotaka
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050404976
Serizawa, Shigehiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090252717
Wakayama, Takuma
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080448654
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2019-11
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2019-11
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1048
Volume: 1048
Pages: 1-88
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: advice effect
strategy-proofness
Vickrey auction
pay-your-bid auction
market design
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): January 2019. Revised November 2019.
We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, with and without advice, we find that our experimental results are not attributed to so-called experimenter demand effects. Strategy-proof mechanisms are sometimes criticized because players often fail to find the benefit of truth-telling, but our observations tell that introducing an educative announcement helps them behave“correctly.”
References (URI): https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2019/DP1048R.pdf
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2019/DP1048R.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華