The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking

• 資料種別: 文書・図像類
• タイトル: The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking
• 著者・編者: Daido, Kohei; Murooka, Takeshi
• 著者標目: Daido, Kohei; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000070388354; Murooka, Takeshi; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000010796345
• 出版事項: Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
• 出版年月日等: 2022-11-25
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2022-11-25
• タイトル（掲載誌）: OSIPP Discussion Paper
• 巻号年月日等（掲載誌）: DP-2022-E-005
• 掲載巻: DP-2022-E-005
• 掲載ページ: 1-29
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 件名標目: Multitasking; Signaling; Leadership; Pay for Performance; Help; Overwork
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 一般注記: We study multitasking problems where an agent engages in both a contractible task and a non-contractible task, which are substitutes. The agent has private information on the value of the non-contractible task, and there are followers who can also contribute to this task. We highlight a new mechanism by incorporating leading-by-example (Hermalin, 1998) in a multi-tasking model. To prevent excessive effort by the agent with low value on the non-contractible task, the principal provides high-powered incentives for the contractible task. We discuss its organizational implications to pay for performance, incentives to help colleagues, and prevention of overwork.
• 参照（URI）: URI; http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2022/DP2022E005.pdf
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• 提供元機関・データベース: 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫 桜華