The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Daido, Koheiほか

Publisher: Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

Publication date: 2022-11-25

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We study multitasking problems where an agent engages in both a contractible task and a non-contractible task, which are substitutes. The agent has pr...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking
Author/Editor: Daido, Kohei
Murooka, Takeshi
Author Heading: Daido, Kohei
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000070388354
Murooka, Takeshi
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000010796345
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2022-11-25
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2022-11-25
Periodical title: OSIPP Discussion Paper
No. or year of volume/issue: DP-2022-E-005
Volume: DP-2022-E-005
Pages: 1-29
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Multitasking
Signaling
Leadership
Pay for Performance
Help
Overwork
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We study multitasking problems where an agent engages in both a contractible task and a non-contractible task, which are substitutes. The agent has private information on the value of the non-contractible task, and there are followers who can also contribute to this task. We highlight a new mechanism by incorporating leading-by-example (Hermalin, 1998) in a multi-tasking model. To prevent excessive effort by the agent with low value on the non-contractible task, the principal provides high-powered incentives for the contractible task. We discuss its organizational implications to pay for performance, incentives to help colleagues, and prevention of overwork.
References (URI): URI
http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2022/DP2022E005.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華